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Evidence-free Policy: The Case of the
National Injury Insurance Scheme
Mark Harrison1

Abstract
The Productivity Commission report ‘Disability Care and Support’ recommends
tort liability be replaced by a compulsory, government-run, no-fault scheme. But
theory and evidence indicate moving to a no-fault scheme will increase the accident
rate. Even a move from non-risk-rated third-party insurance to non-risk-rated
first-party insurance reduces incentives for care. A no-fault scheme is not superior
to current policies; genuine reform will need to be informed by law and economics
literature.

Introduction
In its 2011 ‘Disability Care and Support’ report, the Productivity Commission
(PC) concludes that the current State-based disability support system is
‘underfunded, unfair, fragmented and inefficient’ (PC 2011a: 2). It recommended
replacing the State-based schemes with a National Disability Insurance Scheme
(NDIS). Both political parties supported legislation to establish the scheme and a
0.5 percentage point increase in the Medicare levy to help fund it.
With all attention focused on multi-billion-dollar increases in spending on
disability support, far less scrutiny was afforded the other recommendation in
the Productivity Commission’s report:
State and territory governments should create insurance schemes that
would provide fully-funded care and support for all catastrophic injuries
on a no-fault basis, and that would collectively constitute a National
Injury Insurance Scheme (NIIS).
The NIIS would include all medical treatment, rehabilitation, home and
vehicle modifications and care costs, and cover catastrophic injuries from
motor vehicle, medical (excluding cases of cerebral palsy associated with
pregnancy or birth, which would be covered by the NDIS), criminal
1
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and general accidents. Common law rights to sue for long-term care and
support should be removed, though access to damages for pecuniary
and economic loss, and general damages would remain. (PC 2011b: 88,
Recommendation 18.1)
The Productivity Commission recommended that all states create no-fault motor
accident insurance schemes by 2013, other forms of catastrophic injury be
covered by 2015, and an inquiry be held in 2020 to examine widening coverage
to damage for pecuniary and economic and to some non-catastrophic injuries
(PC 2011b: 90, Recommendations 18.6, 18.7).
The PC estimates the NIIS would have cost an extra $830 million a year in 2011—
to be raised from increasing compulsory third-party insurance premiums for
motor vehicles, medical indemnity premiums, surcharges on rail passengers,
levies on boats, increased municipal rates and from general revenue (PC 2010b:
907, 913).

The National Injury Insurance Scheme:
A ‘no evidence’ based policy
For a policy initiative to be worthy of the name ‘reform’ we must have
some confidence, based on established theory or evidence, that it is
likely to yield a net benefit to the community over time (Banks 2012:
107).2
There are over 20 000 people with a ‘catastrophic-level’ injury in Australia,
with up to a thousand being injured each year. Around half of all catastrophic
injuries are the result of motor vehicle accidents, eight per cent are work
related, 11 per cent arise from medical incidents, with the remaining 32 per cent
are classed as general injuries, typically associated with sport and recreation
activities, criminal assault and catastrophic falls (PC 2011b: 793).
Currently the Northern Territory, NSW, Victoria and Tasmania have no-fault
insurance schemes for motor vehicle accidents, the other states have fault-based
tort law liability, where an accident victim can only claim from a negligent
injurer, who usually carries compulsory third-party insurance (PC 2011b: 790).
The PC’s NIIS proposal involves major changes for all. Except for the Northern
Territory (which abolished common law rights to sue for transport accidents),
the current no-fault schemes are ‘add-ons’, with limited no-fault benefits. They
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preserve the right to sue for damages under tort law and apply only to motor
vehicle accidents. Some require a threshold level of damage to sue under common
law; others do not restrict access to tort actions (Luntz et al. 2009: 53–6).
Ironically, it falls to mainly Coalition state governments to implement this longstanding Labor Party policy. In 1973, the Whitlam Government appointed the
architect of New Zealand’s no-fault accident scheme, Sir Owen Woodhouse, to
chair a Committee of Inquiry into a National Rehabilitation and Compensation
Scheme for Personal Injury in Australia. It duly recommended a similar scheme
for Australia, and the Whitlam Government put legislation to Parliament in
1974 to implement a national no-fault scheme. It did not pass the Senate amidst
doubts whether the Commonwealth had power to abolish State tort rights.
All Australian States rejected the Woodhouse Committee’s recommendation
that common law actions be abolished. Whitlam later introduced a redraft as
a private member’s bill in February 1977 whilst Leader of the Opposition, but
it was not successful. A national no-fault compensation scheme was part of the
Labor Party’s 1983 election platform (Drabsch 2005: 20–3).
The States have agreed to introduce no-fault lifetime care and support for
people who are catastrophically injured in motor vehicle accidents prior to
the commencement of the NDIS launch (COAG undated: 18). NSW and South
Australia have announced plans to convert their compulsory third-party car
insurance arrangements, where drivers must insure against the risk of being
held legally liable to another (the ‘third party’), into compulsory first-party nofault schemes, where the policy holder (the first party) is insured against the
risk of suffering loss.

The lessons of the law and economics literature
No small factor in the acceptance of both the NDIS and NIIS was the imprimatur
of the widely respected PC. What has gone completely unremarked is the quality
of the policy analysis in the PC’s report.
The PC claims that ‘in the presence of insurance, especially with little focus on
risk-rating for some causes of injury, the common law does not provide incentives
for prudent behaviour by motorists and other parties’ (PC 2011b: 789); and that
no-fault insurance would ‘currently perform no worse at deterring excessively
risky behaviour, as despite the appearance of the common law, it is the insurer
that pays’ (ibid).
These statements ignore and contradict the vast theoretical and empirical law
and economics literature on the very issues examined in the Commission’s
57
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report: the effect of tort law and different liability arrangements, insurance,
litigation costs, settlement, regulation and criminal sanctions and no-fault
insurance schemes.
In the report’s 70-plus pages of references there are only three law and economics
articles, only one article with ‘no fault’ in the title (although that one is from
Agenda) and the PC does not refer to any of the top law and economics journals,
law and economics textbooks, empirical or theoretical law and economics survey
articles (such as in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, The
Handbook of Law and Economics, or the Encyclopedia of Law and Economics —
where the article on no-fault insurance is written by an Australian, McEwin
2000), or any of the pioneers of law and economics, such as Calabresi, Posner or
Shavell or their classic and still fundamental books on accidents such as Shavell
(1987), Landes and Posner (1987), or Calabresi (1968). Some of these were cited
in PC (2004) and some are in the PC’s own library.
The PC criticises how the current fault-based system compensates accident
victims: with poor coverage (it covers only a small sub-set of losses: where there
is a negligent party to sue) and high legal costs. It also denounces lump-sum
payments, uncertain court outcomes, delays and settlement procedures.
The law and economics approach takes the objective of the legal system regarding
accidents to be the minimisation of their total social costs: the costs of prevention,
the costs of injuries that nonetheless occur, the costs of administration (such as
litigation costs) and the costs of risk bearing. The law and economics approach
agrees that insurance is much better than the liability system as a means of
compensating risk-averse victims against loss, but emphasises the effect of the
liability system on incentives to reduce risk through the deterrence of harm. It
is true that tort law is a costly and incomplete form of compensation, but the
litigation costs may be worth bearing if they cause enough efficient deterrence.
The issue is which system is socially most efficient given overall costs and
benefits, which include administrative and legal costs.
Third-party insurance indemnifies vehicle owners and drivers who are legally
liable for personal injury caused to any other party in the event of a motor
vehicle accident. The PC claims that compulsory third-party insurance removes
any incentives for care, so that replacing the current system with no-fault
insurance would not increase accidents.
But the PC ignores here a fundamental contribution of the law and economics
literature: the idea of bilateral care or joint causation. The chance of an accident
depends on the actions of both the injurer and victim. How common-law tort
liability solves the bilateral care problem is one of the intellectual achievements
of law and economics (see Shavell 1987; Landes and Posner 1987). The incentive
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not to be found negligent and avoid liability gives the injurer an incentive to
meet the court-determined standard of due care. If the injurer takes due care,
the accident costs are borne by the victim, who then has the incentive to take
an efficient level of care.
It is true that if premiums cannot be adjusted in response to care taken, then
third-party insurance will reduce the insured’s care, the so-called moral hazard
problem. But tort law still affects the victim’s incentive. If the injurer is negligent,
the victim may claim compensation from the insurer of the owner/driver of
the ‘at-fault’ vehicle. But if the victim is also at fault, the compensation may
be reduced under contributory negligence. The victim’s damages are reduced
according to the claimant’s share of the responsibility for the accident (what
economists call ‘comparative negligence’) (Luntz et al. 2009: 322). This provides
an incentive for the victim to meet the standard of due care set by the courts, in
order to preserve his right to damages.
In his devastating critique of the same arguments for abolishing negligence law
from the New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Swan (1984) writes:
…even if the defendant in negligence actions is taken care of by the
insurer so that both negligent and non-negligent drivers still pay the same
third-party premiums, this still leaves the would-be plaintiff and victim
who is denied compensation if shown to be negligent. It is surprising
the Commission should believe that with potentially tens of thousands if
not close to a million dollars at stake in some cases, that negligence laws
have no deterrent effect. By comparison fines and penalties for drunkdriving, disobeying road laws, etc., are generally small in comparison
even if a conviction can be obtained. In fact the very severity of the
penalties for negligent behaviour under the fault laws often gives rise
to claims that ‘no-fault’ should be introduced because fault laws are
too harsh. Advocates of ‘no-fault’ cannot have their cake and eat it too.
Either the fault system does not deter or has penalties which are too
severe but not both (Swan 1984: 100).
Victims’ care is particularly important in motor vehicle accidents, where a
substantial portion of accidents involve motor vehicles crashing into each other.
In 2010, multi-vehicle crashes were 42 per cent of Australian fatal road traffic
accidents (ABS 2013: 4). Drivers cannot be sure in advance whether they will
be an injurer or a victim. Even with compulsory third-party insurance, tort law
gives drivers an incentive to be careful in their role as victims.
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In summary, no-fault insurance would reduce the victim’s incentive for
care. Under a no-fault scheme, drivers are guaranteed compensation even if
unlicensed, speeding and blind drunk — and are treated the same as people
they crash into.
No-fault insurance will, therefore, increase the number and cost of accidents. The
amount depends on the importance of victim’s care and its response to changes
in incentives. Exactly how much deterrence tort law provides is ultimately an
empirical question.
The PC proposes extending no-fault insurance to cover all general accidents.
Many would not currently involve third-party insurance, so compulsory firstparty insurance will reduce incentives for injurer and victim care. For example,
self-inflicted accidents would be covered — such as falling off ladders or singlevehicle accidents — which accounted for 44 per cent of fatal road traffic accidents
in Australia in 2010 (ABS 2013: 4). When no other person contributes to, or is
involved in, the accident, the costs of these accidents tend to be internalised
and efficient levels of accident prevention adopted (the victim and injurer are
the same person). Moreover, people can choose to take out first-party insurance
and internalise the resulting moral hazard costs. Introducing compulsory nofault insurance for general accidents, financed through municipal rates, will
externalise costs to taxpayers, reducing the incentives for care. Again, the
extent to which accidents increase is an empirical matter.
A further law and economics insight that the PC ignores is the incentive legal
and insurance arrangements give for excessive activity levels. Only observable
precautions can be made part of the court’s standard of due care, and the
prospect of being found negligent does not encourage parties to take costjustified precautions that the court cannot observe. The activity level is the
extent of participation in the activity that is the source of the accident, such
as kilometres driven. Usually courts do not include the activity level in the
required standard of care, because they cannot observe it or judge whether it
is excessive. The court can judge whether the driver was negligent in how he
drove but not whether he was negligent in how much he drove — whether his
marginal trip was worth taking, given the expected accident costs it produced.
Expected accident losses depend not only on the care exercised by each party
but also on each party’s activity level. For example, the number of car accidents
depends on how many kilometres are driven.
Under a negligence rule, drivers drive too much, since having taken the efficient
level of precaution they are no longer liable for damages. Injurers do not bear
the full social costs of their activity, but impose an external cost on accident
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victims, who bear their accident costs. Injurers only consider their net benefits
from extra participation in the activity but not the increase in expected victim
accident costs, resulting in excessive activity levels.
Under compulsory third-party insurance, accident costs are externalised onto
the insurance company. But the premium charged to drivers will reflect this cost
— internalising this cost for the participation decision (whether to drive at all),
which may deter some from becoming drivers (such as young high-risk drivers).
But as insurance premiums are some fixed annual amount and do not vary with
kilometres driven, if the driver chooses to participate, then there is still an
incentive for excessive activity levels (that is, to drive too many kilometres),
with accident costs externalised across premiums for all drivers. If damages
under-compensate accident victims, then they bear some of the external cost
as well.
The per-kilometre accident externality is significant. Connelly and Supangan
(2006) estimated the total costs of road traffic crashes in Australia as $17 billion
in 2003, equivalent to 2.3 per cent of that year’s GDP (Clarke and Prentice 2009:
54). Motor vehicles in Australia travelled an estimated 201 497 million kilometres
in the 12 months ended 31 October 2003 (ABS 2003), so accident costs averaged
around 8.4 cents per vehicle kilometre. More than half these costs are external
(single-vehicle accidents are less than half of accidents, and all the costs borne
by victims of other accidents are external).
No-fault insurance exacerbates the activity level externality. It increases the
accident externality per kilometre through reducing care and covers a greater
portion of victim accident costs (externalising more accident costs). The PC
does not consider this externality or policies to combat it, such as per-kilometre
insurance premiums.
The extent to which replacing the negligence rule with no-fault insurance will
increase accident costs through reducing care and increasing activity levels is
an empirical issue. The PC asserts: ‘Nor is there evidence that the common law
right to sue for compensation for care costs increases incentives for prudent
behaviour by drivers, doctors and other parties’ (PC 2011b: 43).
As Swan (1984: 100) points out:
Typically with statements like these denying the efficacy of the tort
system there is a certain shyness towards coming to grips with the
evidence. Perhaps the feeling is that it is better to allow an assertion to
stand unadorned with supporting evidence when there is little or none
available and to conveniently not be aware of statistical and econometric
evidence which may reach different conclusions.
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The claim that there is no evidence that the right to sue for compensation
creates incentives for prudent behaviour is simply false, as Googling the words
‘empirical evidence no-fault insurance’ reveals. Adding the word ‘Australia’ to
your search leads you to studies on the effect of the various State-level nofault insurance schemes. The only evidence the PC cites (PC 2011b: 837–8) for
its conclusion is a statement from Cane (2007: 55–6, 69), a distinguished law
professor:
There is a significant body of empirical research about the deterrent
efficacy of the tort system, which can perhaps be summarised by saying
that tort law has more deterrent effect in some contexts than others, but
in no context does it deter as effectively as economic theory of tort law
would suggest. … the conclusion that tort law is not worth what it costs
is an attractive one.
Cane (2007) in turn cites one reference to support his statement, Schwartz
(1994), which surveys the empirical literature on tort. Schwartz (1994: 443) does
state that tort law is not ‘as effective as economic models suggest’ (whatever
that means) but he recognises that tort law covers different fields, with different
characteristics, and there is no reason why deterrence should be the same across
all of them. He surveys four fields: workers’ injuries, motorist liability (including
no-fault schemes), medical malpractice and products liability. He concludes (pp.
379, 444):
…tort law provides a significant amount of deterrence … the Article
considers how much deterrence tort law needs to achieve if the tort
system is to provide deterrence benefits that justify its various costs. The
Article here develops findings about the medical malpractice system and
the auto liability system that are tentatively favorable. Even conceding
their tentativeness, these findings highlight the public policy value that
can flow from even the moderate amount of deterrence that the tort
system can provide. … sector-by-sector, tort law provides something
significant by way of deterrence.
Yet the PC and Cane cite it in support of precisely the opposite conclusion.
The Schwartz conclusion is supported by a vast empirical literature on medical
malpractice and no-fault motor vehicle insurance, including studies by
economists McEwin (1989) and Swan (1984) of the Australian experience with
no-fault schemes, which the PC simply ignores.
The other surveys of the empirical evidence come to the same conclusion as
Schwartz. For example, Dewees et al. (1996: v) note:
Following this review of the evidence, we conclude that the deterrent
properties of the tort system seem strongest for auto accidents and
62
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weakest for environmentally related accidents. The incentive effects
of the system are mixed in the case of medical and product-related
accidents, making net welfare judgments problematic; in the case of
workplace accidents, workers’ compensation levies appear to have
stronger deterrent effects than the tort system did have or might have if
it were resurrected in this context.
Other surveys include van Velthoven (2009), Sloan and Chepke (2007) and Liao
and White (2002). The surveys summarise dozens of studies on the effects of
medical malpractice liability and no-fault insurance.

The lessons of experience
The studies of no-fault insurance usually examine the effect of a shift to no-fault
insurance on motor vehicle accident deaths, despite many no-fault schemes
leaving tort liability intact in death cases. The justification is the probabilistic
nature of accidents — less care means more accidents and some fraction will be
fatal (Posner 2011: 258).
The results differ greatly — some finding shifting to no-fault in various states
in the U.S. had no effect, others finding a 15 per cent increase in deaths. That
is to be expected, as the switch to no-fault involves changes in liability rules
and in insurance arrangements. The effect of introducing no-fault insurance
depends on the system before it was introduced (such as liability insurance
arrangements) and the details of the scheme introduced. For example, many
schemes (as in NSW and Victoria) retain large elements of tort law and provide
relatively modest no-liability benefits. For example, many no-fault schemes
exclude damages for pain and suffering, and so under-compensate victims
(which increases victim care costs).
The most relevant studies for the NIIS proposal examine the effects of a shift
to a pure no-fault scheme that abolishes tort liability, as in New Zealand or for
motor vehicles in Quebec and the Northern Territory. Swan (1984) and McEwin
(1989) present empirical evidence on the switch to no-fault in New Zealand
and the Northern Territory, compared to other states of Australia, and find it
to be associated with a substantial increase of 16 to 20 per cent in the number
of road fatalities. In Quebec, fatalities increased between 3 and 9 per cent (see,
for example, van Velthoven 2009: 475; and Dewees et al. 1996: 25). Hause (1995)
finds little initial effect of the NZ scheme on overall fatality rates, but a modest
long-run trend effect in increasing fatal accident rates over what they otherwise
would have been.

63

Agenda, Volume 20, Number 1, 2013

Clearly there is a trade-off that the PC ignores. No-fault insurance may
compensate victims better, but is likely to increase accident costs. It is a difficult
policy issue — what are the equity effects of helping those with catastrophic
injuries, but creating more people in those circumstances? It doesn’t help to
assume the trade-off doesn’t exist.
Further, the trade-off may vary across different types of activities. For example,
in many medical accidents, victim’s care is not particularly important (although
patients need to take their medicine). But it clearly is in work accidents and
product liability. On the other hand, protecting their reputation gives doctors an
incentive to avoid being found negligent. Many people think that the avoidance
of negligence results in too much medical practice conducted not to ensure the
health of the patient, but to safeguard against malpractice liability.
The PC reviews existing arrangements and the mechanics of bringing the
different activities under a NIIS, but does not provide separate justifications
for moving to no-fault for medical accidents, motor vehicle accidents, criminal
injuries and household accidents. There is no analysis of the trade-off in each
case because the PC assumes there is no trade-off.
Moreover, the PC doesn’t seem to realise that motor vehicle accidents, involving
accidents between strangers who cannot negotiate beforehand, is a different
case from medical malpractice and workers’ compensation, with different
theoretical and empirical literatures. In medical and workplace settings, the
parties voluntarily enter a contractual relationship, can negotiate beforehand
and there is a market price that can adjust in response to different liability and
insurance arrangements. Liability rules have less effect. Well-conceived liability
rules might differ as between categories such as motor vehicle accidents,
workplace accidents, medical malpractice and product liability.
Further, the PC pushes for a national scheme on the basis that ‘there is little
rationale for the striking differences between the states’ (PC 2010b: 789). But
once it is realised the optimal scheme involves trade-offs, and these trade-offs
differ between states, then there is no reason why the same policy is best for
all states. For example, the PC draw attention to the ‘complex challenge’ of the
extremely high serious-injury accident rate in the Northern Territory, which it
puts down to ‘the special circumstances of the Northern Territory’ (PC 2010b:
908). Either the Northern Territory’s high accident rate is because it is the
only state to have abolished tort law rights for motor accident victims (the PC’s
preferred scheme) or because it is different from other states. The trade-offs
relevant for accident policy depend on the number and severity of accidents
and how they respond to changes. The best policy for a high-accident state
could be a no-fault scheme (because of greater administrative cost savings and
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there may not be much effect on care for whatever reason). It is not surprising
that the Northern Territory has a different policy from the rest of Australia —
and not necessarily desirable that the rest of Australia adopt that policy.

The way of genuine reform
The PC recommends tort liability be replaced a compulsory, government-run,
no-fault scheme (PC 2010: 848–9); it does not consider other possible reforms.
The fault-based system is combined with a highly regulated insurance market.
Rather than considering the best way to reform the current insurance market
and legal regime, the PC simply recommends abolishing both. But good policy
analysis would examine the liability system, insurance arrangements and their
interaction, diagnose the accident system’s faults and identify the best way to
improve matters. For example, would reform of tort law be a better option?
A per-kilometre tax? Strict liability? Why isn’t a mixed approach of no-fault
and fault-based liability, where victims are allowed to opt out and sue injurers
under the tort system if their losses exceed a threshold (as in NSW, Victoria and
Tasmania), a better approach? It is identical to the pure tort rule if the threshold
is zero and identical to the pure no-fault rule if the threshold is infinite. Liao
and White (2002) find that whether a pure tort, pure no-fault or a mixed system
is best depends on factors like the court error rate, but they abstract from
insurance market interactions.
Even if it is agreed that a pure no-fault insurance is superior to fault-based
liability, where is the analysis establishing the case for compulsion and
government monopoly in insurance provision? For example, private insurance
markets may not exist because, once insured, people no longer take care and
this moral hazard makes premiums too expensive. A government scheme faces
the same moral hazard problems, and would be inefficient to introduce. Why
do so few people take out first-party insurance for accidents? Is making it
compulsory really the best response? Should we have a government monopoly
on its provision? Should we have risk-rating? Per-kilometre premiums?3
The PC recommends including household accidents and criminal compensation,
to be funded out of local rate increases. There is no analysis of the likely effects
on accidents, interactions with current insurance markets, why private markets

3 One advantage of a federal system is the ability of states to experiment with different policies — which
could then be adopted by other states if successful. The PC does not draw any lessons from the different
insurance and compensation arrangements in the states. It does not conduct, or refer to, any empirical work
on the costs and benefits of the different insurance arrangements (such as the different types of no-fault
schemes).
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have failed and this is the best response, or how current criminal compensation
schemes (all states have one) have worked and why expanding them is
appropriate.
Government-run insurance schemes are very different from private insurance
arrangements. Private companies attempt to deal with the moral hazard effect
of insurance through partial insurance coverage (through deductibles or coinsurance), experience-rating (such as raising future premiums if there is
a claim on the policy through the use of no-claim bonuses) and risk-rating:
charging different prices to people with different risks (for example, discounts
for those with car alarms), which sends a price signal to people engaging in risky
behaviour. They may make a reduction in risk a precondition for issuing an
insurance policy. Because of political incentives, providers of compulsory thirdparty insurance are often regulated to prevent them from taking these measures
to control moral hazard. Government monopolies simply charge a uniform
premium, or cover costs through taxes and levies. Charging the same premium
to groups of people with different risks means the safer groups subsidise the
more dangerous groups. More high-risk people participate in the activity when
they face higher premiums, increasing overall risk and average premiums.
The PC agrees risk-rating has not been politically acceptable in compulsory
third-party insurance, and argues it could be undertaken in a no-fault scheme,
though it stops short of recommending it (PC 2010b: 833–6). Clearly a government
agency has less incentive to reduce risk and discourage risky behaviour, because
those risks are covered by others. The agency’s political support comes from
helping, not criticising. (Sowell 2004: 136). Government agencies seldom have
enough assets to cover liabilities, but rely on pay-as-you-go — making current
payments out of general revenue. As taxes distort decisions, financing insurance
payouts with taxes incurs an additional excess burden. In contrast with a market
system of insurance, cross-subsidies (including from future generations) are not
competed away.
State-run insurance schemes are prone to excessive use, poor control of claims,
inattention to rehabilitation and expansion of their scope. Accident victims face
ever-changing rules on benefits and eligibility — they have no policy contract
on which they can rely (Kerr 1996: 6). The New Zealand Business Roundtable
(NZBR 1998: 145) points out:
State control of accident insurance in New Zealand does not appear to have
induced state agencies to produce meaningful measures for monitoring
the Corporation’s performance with respect to the accident prevention
objective, nor to assess the performance of New Zealand’s no-liability
arrangement or its occupational health and safety regulations. Instead,
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heroically massaged figures are used in a departmental publication to
make a case for greater government expenditure and regulatory effort,
rather than to evaluate the efficacy of existing programmes.
By establishing a government monopoly, the PC entrenches these distortions
of the insurance market, rather than recommending reforms to improve its
operation.
Theory and evidence suggest that moving to a no-fault scheme will increase the
accident rate. Even a move from non-risk-rated third-party insurance to nonrisk-rated first-party insurance reduces incentives for care. A no-fault scheme
is not a costless panacea evidently superior to current policies. Policy analysis
is about weighing up the costs and benefits of various imperfect options and
institutional arrangements. That is complex and requires a theoretical framework
— which law and economics provides.
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